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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. : 
PAUL TRAVIS REESE SANWICK, : Case No. 20176 
Defendant-Appellant 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of a per curiam decision 
filed by this Court on August 15, 1985. Originally, this case 
was an appeal from a guilty plea and conviction of rape, a first 
degree felony, by Paul Travis Reese Sanwick. Mr. Sanwick was 
sentenced in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County before Jay E. Banks, Judge, to five years to life 
imprisonment on July 30, 1984. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant (Appellant's 
Brief at 1-3). 
ARGUMENT 
In its per curiam opinion, State v. Sanwick, Opinion No. 
20176 (Utah 1985\ the Court has either misapprehended or overlooked 
the primary contention advanced in Appellant's Brief. The opinion 
seems to focus on the use of hearsay in the presentence report 
and Appellant's opportunity to rebut the hearsay. Appellant conceded 
that the Rules of Evidence are not applicable to sentencing proceedings 
(Appellant's Brief at 5) and now concedes that hearsay statements 
may be included in presentence reports. However, the point not 
addressed by this Court in its opinion is the Appellant's contention 
that the sentencing judge clearly violated statutory requirements 
in the sentencing process (Appellant's Brief at 4). 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(4) (previously §77-18-1(2)) (1953 
as amended) states: 
(4) Prior to imposition of any sentence for 
an offense for which probation may be granted, 
the court may, with the concurrence of the 
defendant, continue the date for the imposition 
of sentence for a reasonable period of time 
for the purpose of obtaining a pre-sentence 
report or information from other sources on 
the defendant. The report shall be prepared 
by the adult probation and parole section 
of the Department of Corrections. The report 
shall include a specific statement of pecuniary 
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from 
Adult Probation and Parole regarding the payment 
of restitution by the defendant. The contents 
of the report shall be confidential. The 
court may disclose all or parts of the report 
to the defendant or his counsel as the interest 
of justice requires. At the time of sentence, 
the court shall hear any testimony or information 
the defendant or the prosecuting attorney 
may wish to present concerning the appropriate 
sentence. This testimony or information shall 
be presented in open court on record and in 
the presence of the defendant. (Emphasis 
added) 
This code section is neither vague nor ambiguous in its statement 
that a trial judge "shall1' hear "any" evidence which a defendant 
wishes to present at a sentencing proceeding. The section clearly 
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requires that a defendant be allowed to present any evidence concerning 
the sentence. The judge is left with no discretion in the matter. 
In the present case, defense counsel moved the trial court 
for an order requiring the prosecutor to produce two witnesses 
in the case, Tamara and Andara Sanwick, whose whereabouts were 
apparently unknown to defense counsel (R. 33). The prosecutor 
in the case had previously refused to voluntarily comply with 
such a request (R. 60). The defendants attorney wanted the witnesses 
to be available either for an informal interview or to present 
testimony at the sentencing proceeding (R. 60). The witnesses 
were vital to the defense to refute allegations of violence during 
the crime. The trial judge heard the defense motion four days 
prior to the sentencing and summarily denied the motion even though 
no opposition was presented by the prosecutor (R. 60). 
It is this failure to follow the statutory requirements 
which was raised in Appellant's Brief (p. 4) which this Court 
failed to address in its opinion. The failure to address this 
issue led to some erroneous conclusions in the Courtfs opinion. 
First, the opinion noted: "To begin with, the trial court made 
it clear in pronouncing sentence that the accusations of violence 
did not form the exclusive basis for sending defendant to prison, 
. . . ." TA. at 2. (Emphasis added) However, if the accusations 
of violence were false (which only the two witnesses in question 
could have confirmed), then these accusations should have played 
no part in the judge's sentencing decision. 
Further, this Court's opinion stated: "At the time of 
sentencing, the court heard testimony defendant wanted to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence." Ld. Finally, the opinion 
said, "Defendant had every chance to examine fully and controvert 
any prejudicial information that he claimed played a part in the 
sentencing procedure.11 I_d. at 3. In fact, the trial judge1 s 
refusal to allow Mr. Sanwick to present or even interview two 
vital witnesses makes both of these statements nonsequiturs. At 
the time of sentencing, the court did not hear testimony which 
the defendant wanted to present. Furthermore, the defendant did 
not have a chance to controvert prejudicial information in the 
sentencing procedure. 
Procedural fairness is as important at the sentencing phase 
as at the guilt phase of a criminal proceeding, State v. Casarez, 
656 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982), and further, the sentencing procedure 
must fulfill the requirements of due process, State v. Lipsky, 
608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980). According to Utah Code Ann. §77-18-
1(4), supra, the Appellant should have been able to present any 
testimony concerning his sentence. However, a clearly erroneous 
ruling by the trial court prevented Mr. Sanwick from presenting 
such testimony. The ruling, which is as yet uncorrected, effectively 
denied Mr. Sanwick due process of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Because this Court either misapprehended or overlooked 
Appellant's primary contention in its decision in this case, the 
Appellant respectfully petitions this Court to reconsider that 
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decision and reverse and remand his sentence for redetermination. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of August, 1985. 
CURTIS NESSET 
Attorney for Petitioner 
I hereby certify that I delivered copies of the foregoing 
to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this day of August, 1985. 
CERTIFICATION 
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(1) I am the attorney for Appellant/Petitioner in this 
case and; 
(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court 
in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case. 
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